In Vosburg v. Putney (1891), the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that a defendant is liable for battery when he intentionally makes an unlawful contact with another person, even if he did not intend to cause harm and even if the resulting injury was far greater than anyone could have foreseen. The court established the 'eggshell plaintiff' rule: the defendant takes his victim as he finds him and is liable for the full extent of the injury caused by his wrongful act. A schoolboy who lightly kicked a classmate in the shin was held liable for the leg that was ultimately crippled.

Here's why this case leads off so many Torts courses: it looks absurd on the facts — a kid gets a tiny tap in the shin and walks away with a life-altering injury and a big verdict — but it packs two of the most-tested doctrines in intentional torts into a single story. Get Vosburg right and you understand what "intent" actually means in battery, and you understand why a defendant can owe damages wildly out of proportion to what he did. Get it wrong and you'll spend the rest of the semester thinking battery requires an intent to hurt someone. It doesn't.

What is the Vosburg v. Putney case about? (Case Summary)

Vosburg v. Putney, 80 Wis. 523, 50 N.W. 403 (1891), is a decision of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin. The plaintiff, Andrew Vosburg (about 14 years old), and the defendant, George Putney (about 11 years old), were classmates. After class had been called to order, Putney reached across the aisle and lightly kicked Vosburg in the shin. The kick was slight — Vosburg didn't even feel it at first — but Vosburg had a preexisting injury at that spot, an infection set in, and he ultimately lost the use of his leg. The jury awarded him $2,500. The case reached the Wisconsin Supreme Court on the defendant's appeal, and the court's opinion became the canonical statement of the intent element of battery and the extent-of-liability rule for intentional torts.

What are the facts of Vosburg v. Putney?

The legally significant facts are simpler than the medical ones, so hold onto them:

• The two boys were seated across an aisle from each other in a schoolroom.
• The contact happened after the teacher had called the class to order — this timing is doing real doctrinal work, so don't skip it.
• Putney kicked Vosburg lightly in the shin. There was no evidence he intended to hurt Vosburg — this was more of a schoolboy prod than an attack.
• Vosburg had a preexisting injury or weakness at the exact spot that was kicked. The trivial contact reactivated it, an infection developed, and Vosburg lost the use of his leg.
• Critically, Putney had no knowledge of the preexisting condition, and no one could have foreseen this outcome from so slight a kick.

The whole point of the fact pattern is the mismatch between the tiny act and the enormous consequence. That mismatch is what makes the two legal rules bite.

What was the procedural history of Vosburg v. Putney?

Vosburg sued Putney for the injury. The case was tried to a jury, which returned a special verdict finding for Vosburg and awarding $2,500 in damages. There was actually more than one trial in this litigation's history, and the Wisconsin Supreme Court had occasion to address the case on appeal, reviewing the trial court's handling of jury instructions and evidence. The key takeaway for your brief: the case comes up to the state supreme court on the defendant's challenge, and the court is deciding what the correct rule of law is — specifically, what a plaintiff must prove about intent and how far the defendant's liability extends.

What was the legal issue in Vosburg v. Putney?

There are really two intertwined issues, and a good cold-call answer separates them:

1. Intent: Can a defendant be liable for battery when he intended to make the contact but did not intend to cause any harm or injury?
2. Extent of damages: Is a defendant who commits an unlawful intentional contact liable for the full extent of the resulting injury, even when that injury is grossly disproportionate to the act and completely unforeseeable?

What did Vosburg v. Putney hold?

The Wisconsin Supreme Court held for the plaintiff on both issues. On intent, the court held that the intention to do harm is not essential to liability for battery; what matters is that the defendant intended the act — the contact itself — and that the contact was unlawful. On damages, the court held that once the defendant is liable for an unlawful act, he is liable for all injuries resulting directly from that act, whether or not they could have been foreseen. This is the origin point most casebooks use for the eggshell (thin-skull) plaintiff rule.

The rule you put in your outline reads roughly: A defendant is liable for battery if he intentionally makes an unlawful contact with the plaintiff. Intent to cause harm is not required — only intent to do the act. And once the act is unlawful, the defendant is liable for the full extent of the resulting harm, even if it was unforeseeable and disproportionate.

What was the court's reasoning in Vosburg v. Putney?

The heart of the opinion is the concept of unlawfulness, and this is where the "after class was called to order" fact does its work. The court reasoned that on the playground, the ordinary kicks, shoves, and roughhousing of schoolboys are impliedly permitted — there is an implied license among children playing, so contact there would not necessarily be unlawful. But once the teacher called the class to order, that implied license evaporated. In the ordered classroom, Putney's kick violated the recognized rules of conduct and was therefore an unlawful act. Because it was unlawful, the intent to do the act supplied the intent needed for the tort — the law would not additionally require an intent to injure.

On damages, the court's logic follows from the unlawfulness: a wrongdoer who commits an unlawful act does not get to limit his liability to the harm a reasonable person would have expected. He is answerable for the actual, direct consequences, including the aggravation of a hidden preexisting condition. In plain terms — the fact that Vosburg had a weak spot and that a normal kid would have shrugged the kick off is Putney's problem, not Vosburg's. You take your victim as you find him.

Why does Vosburg v. Putney matter?

Vosburg sits at the very front of the intentional torts unit because it isolates the intent element of battery so cleanly. Every 1L arrives believing that to be liable for hurting someone you must have meant to hurt them. Vosburg is the case that breaks that intuition: the law of battery cares whether you intended the contact, not whether you intended the harm. That distinction runs through the entire course — through the transferred intent cases, through the definition of "intent" in the Restatement, and into the constant exam trap of a defendant who says "but I was just joking / I didn't mean to hurt anyone."

It's also the anchor for the eggshell-plaintiff rule, which resurfaces later in negligence and proximate cause. Recognizing that Vosburg established this rule in an intentional tort context — and that the rule then carries over — is exactly the kind of connection that separates a B exam answer from an A.

Cold-Call Prep: the questions your professor will actually ask

This case is a Socratic favorite precisely because the facts seem so unfair to the defendant. Expect your professor to press you on why an 11-year-old owes $2,500 for a light kick. Here's how to be ready:

• "Did Putney intend to hurt Vosburg?" — No, and that's the point. Answer that there was no evidence of intent to injure, then pivot immediately: liability doesn't require it. He intended the contact, and that's enough.
• "Then why is he liable at all?" — Because the contact was unlawful. Battery requires an intentional, unlawful contact — not an intent to harm.
• "What made the contact unlawful? Wouldn't the same kick on the playground be fine?" — This is the trap and the reward. Yes, on the playground there's an implied license for schoolboy contact. The kick became unlawful because it happened after class was called to order, where that implied license no longer applied. If you nail the implied-license point, you've won the cold call.
• "Why should Putney pay for an injury nobody could foresee?" — Because a wrongdoer is liable for all direct consequences of an unlawful act, foreseeable or not. This is the eggshell-plaintiff rule: you take your victim as you find him.
• "Does it matter that they were children?" — Not for the intent analysis here; the standard is whether the child intended the act, and an 11-year-old can form that intent. Don't confuse this with capacity defenses.
• "How is this different from negligence?" — Battery is intentional; the defendant meant to make the contact. Negligence is about unreasonable risk-taking, not intent to act on the person. Watch for professors who use this to launch the whole intent-vs-negligence framing.

How does Vosburg v. Putney show up on the exam?

On an issue-spotter, Vosburg shows up any time a defendant makes a contact that seems minor or well-intentioned but causes big harm — a friendly slap on the back that ruptures something, a light shove during horseplay, a prank gone wrong. The trap is analyzing whether the defendant intended to injure. That's the wrong question and it will cost you points. The right analysis is: (1) Did the defendant intend the contact? (2) Was the contact unlawful/unpermitted — i.e., was there consent or implied license, and was it exceeded? (3) If yes to both, the defendant is liable for the full extent of the harm, so bring in the eggshell rule to sweep in the disproportionate injury.

The second common trap is forgetting the consent/implied-license angle. If your fact pattern has people engaged in a sport, roughhousing, or an activity with understood physical contact, you must discuss whether the contact fell within the implied license — that's the exact issue that decided Vosburg. Strong answers cite the classroom-vs-playground distinction as the framework for measuring the scope of consent.

What cases are taught alongside Vosburg v. Putney?

• Garratt v. Dailey — the boy who pulls the chair; refines what "intent" means (intent to cause the contact, including substantial certainty).
• Mohr v. Williams — the ear surgery consent case; the scope-of-consent problem in a medical context.
• Cole v. Turner / early battery cases — for the definition of unlawful contact and the "least touching in anger" line.
• Wagner v. International Railway and later proximate-cause cases — where the eggshell principle reappears in negligence.

Bottom line for your outline: Vosburg = intent to the act, not the harm; unlawfulness turns on implied license (playground yes, ordered classroom no); and the defendant eats the full, unforeseeable extent of the damage. Three moves, one weird little kick.