Offer and acceptance are the two halves of mutual assent — the moment a contract is born. An offer is a manifestation of willingness to enter a bargain, made so that the other party understands their assent will close the deal; acceptance is the offeree's manifestation of assent to the exact terms of that offer. Without a valid offer that is validly accepted, there is no agreement to enforce, no matter how much the parties talked.
This is the doctrine your Contracts professor will drill from day one, because everything downstream — consideration, defenses, remedies — presupposes that a contract actually formed. On the exam, formation is almost always the first fight. If you can't cleanly say whether there was an offer and whether it was accepted, you can't get to the good stuff. This page walks the elements, how courts apply each, the worked examples your professor loves, and the traps that sink students in December.
Contract formation requires mutual assent — a 'meeting of the minds,' though modern law measures it objectively, not by secret intent. Mutual assent breaks into two components:
The whole doctrine sits on top of the objective theory of contract: courts ask what a reasonable person in the other party's position would have understood the words and conduct to mean, not what a party privately intended. This is why a joke, if it looks serious enough, can form a contract — the classic Lucy v. Zehmer problem, where a man who claimed he was only kidding when he signed a napkin selling his farm was held to the deal because he outwardly manifested assent.
The recurring question is: offer, or mere preliminary negotiation? An offer must communicate present willingness to be bound, with enough definiteness in the essential terms (parties, subject matter, quantity, price, time) that a court could enforce it and identify a breach.
Watch these lines:
Once a valid offer exists, the offeror is the master of the offer. The offeror dictates who can accept, how (by promise or performance), through what medium, and by when. This principle explains half the acceptance disputes on your exam.
The power of acceptance is not permanent. An offer can die five ways, and the timing of death is heavily tested:
Two exceptions to free revocability you must have in your outline: (1) option contracts, where consideration keeps the offer open; and (2) under UCC §2-205, a firm offer — a merchant's signed written promise to hold an offer open — is irrevocable without consideration for the time stated, up to three months.
Acceptance requires: (1) that the offeree have the power of acceptance (the offer is still alive and directed to them), and (2) a manifestation of assent in the manner the offer invites. Break it down:
The mailbox rule (Restatement §63) governs when acceptance becomes effective: an acceptance sent by a reasonable means is effective on dispatch — the moment it leaves the offeree's hands (dropped in the mailbox) — not on receipt. This matters enormously because a contract forms at that instant, so a revocation that arrives afterward is too late.
Contrast the timing rules and you have an exam-winning chart:
The nasty crossover problem: the offeree mails an acceptance, then sends a faster rejection that arrives first. Or mails a rejection, then a faster acceptance. The mailbox rule bends here — if the offeree sends a rejection first, the acceptance is generally treated as effective only if it arrives first, to protect an offeror who may have relied on the rejection. Know the wrinkle; it's a classic issue-spotter plant. The mailbox rule also does not apply to option contracts, where acceptance is effective on receipt.
For contracts for the sale of goods, Article 2 of the UCC displaces the common law and deliberately loosens formation rules to reflect how merchants actually deal.
The threshold move on every formation question: Is this goods or not? If goods, run UCC. If services, real estate, or intangibles, run common law. Get this classification wrong and every downstream rule you cite is the wrong rule.
Example 1 — Offer or ad? A store runs an ad: 'Saturday only — 3 fur coats, $1 each, first come first served.' Anne arrives first and demands one. This is Lefkowitz: the ad is clear, definite, and leaves nothing to negotiate, so it's an offer, and Anne's arrival is acceptance. Compare 'Coats on sale, come see us' — pure invitation, no offer.
Example 2 — Mirror image counteroffer. Ben offers to sell his car for $5,000. Carla replies, 'I'll take it for $4,500.' At common law, Carla has made a counteroffer, which rejects Ben's offer. Ben's original offer is dead; Carla cannot later 'accept' the $5,000 unless Ben renews it.
Example 3 — Mailbox rule timing. Dana offers by letter to sell land, offer open one week. On day 3, Dana mails a revocation. On day 4 — before the revocation arrives — Ed mails his acceptance. Because acceptance is effective on dispatch and revocation only on receipt, a contract formed on day 4 the moment Ed mailed. Dana's revocation arrives too late. (Note: land, so common law, not UCC.)
The single biggest formation trap is treating a counteroffer as an acceptance — students see the parties 'agreeing' and skip the fact that the response changed a term. At common law that's a counteroffer that kills the original offer, and if the original offeror then walks, there is no contract. The mirror-image trap. The second biggest trap is failing to classify goods vs. non-goods, so you apply the mirror image rule to a UCC transaction (where §2-207 explicitly abolishes it). Before you write a word on formation, say to yourself: Is this goods? Common law or UCC? Then trace offer → any termination → acceptance → timing.