In MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. (1916), the New York Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Judge Benjamin Cardozo, held that a manufacturer of a product that is reasonably certain to endanger life if negligently made owes a duty of care to any foreseeable user — not just the person it sold the product to directly. The decision abolished the old "privity of contract" requirement for negligence and set the stage for modern products liability.

This is the case your Torts professor uses to blow up the idea that you can only sue someone you have a contract with. Read it as the turning point: before MacPherson, a consumer hurt by a defective product often had no negligence claim against the manufacturer unless they were in privity. Cardozo took a narrow exception and quietly expanded it into a general rule that governs how manufacturers are held accountable today.

What is the case summary of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.?

MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916), was decided by the New York Court of Appeals — the highest court in New York — with Judge Cardozo writing the majority. Donald MacPherson was injured when a wooden wheel on his Buick collapsed while he was driving. He had bought the car from a retail dealer, not from Buick itself, and Buick had bought the defective wheel from another manufacturer. The question was whether MacPherson could sue Buick in negligence despite having no direct contractual relationship with it. The court said yes.

What are the facts of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.?

Buick manufactured automobiles but did not make all of the component parts — it bought the wheels from another supplier. One of the wooden wheels on a car Buick sold was defective; its spokes were made of defective wood and crumbled into fragments. MacPherson bought that car from a Buick dealer (a retail distributor), not from Buick directly. While MacPherson was driving, the defective wheel collapsed, the car threw him out, and he was injured.

The legally significant facts are the ones that carry the doctrine: (1) Buick was the manufacturer of the finished product; (2) Buick did not inspect the wheel it could reasonably have inspected; (3) MacPherson bought from a dealer, so there was no privity of contract between MacPherson and Buick; and (4) an automobile with a defective wheel is a thing that becomes dangerous when negligently made. Keep the privity gap front and center — it is the whole case.

What was the procedural history?

MacPherson sued Buick in negligence. The trial court entered judgment for MacPherson, and the Appellate Division affirmed. Buick appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that it owed no duty to MacPherson because it had no contract with him — the car was sold to a dealer, and the dealer sold it to MacPherson. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment for MacPherson.

What was the legal issue?

Does a manufacturer owe a duty of care in negligence to the ultimate purchaser and user of a product, even when the manufacturer sold the product to an intermediary (a dealer) rather than directly to the injured party — i.e., even in the absence of privity of contract?

What did MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. hold, and what is the rule?

Holding: Yes. Buick owed a duty of care to MacPherson despite the absence of privity, and it could be liable in negligence for the injuries caused by the defective wheel.

The rule (the part that goes in your outline): If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently made, then it is a thing of danger, and the manufacturer owes a duty of care to any person who could foreseeably be endangered by its use — regardless of contract. Knowledge that the product will be used by persons other than the immediate purchaser, without new tests, adds to the duty. The absence of privity is no defense.

Note the two-part trigger Cardozo builds: (1) the product must be one that is reasonably certain to endanger life if negligently made, and (2) the manufacturer must have knowledge that the thing will be used by persons other than the buyer. When both are present, the duty follows the product to the foreseeable user.

What was the court's reasoning?

Cardozo started with the old rule from Winterbottom v. Wright and its American descendant Thomas v. Winchester: a manufacturer generally owed a duty only to the party it contracted with, with a narrow exception for things "inherently dangerous" — poisons, explosives, and the like. Over the years New York courts had stretched that exception (a defective coffee urn, a defective scaffold), and Cardozo used those cases to argue that the exception had already outgrown its original label.

His key move was to reframe the category. Instead of asking whether a product is inherently dangerous (a fixed, narrow list), Cardozo asked whether the product becomes dangerous when negligently made and whether harm to someone other than the buyer is reasonably foreseeable. An automobile, he reasoned, is not a bomb, but a car with a defective wheel driven at speed is plainly a danger to life. And Buick knew the car would be resold to and used by someone other than the dealer. Foreseeability of the danger, not the label "inherently dangerous," became the test. Because Buick had the ability and the responsibility to inspect the wheel and failed to, it could be liable to the foreseeable user.

In essence, Cardozo grounded duty in foreseeability of harm rather than in the contract chain. The liability sounds in tort — a duty imposed by law on manufacturers — not in the parties' contract. That is why privity drops out: the duty was never really about the contract in the first place.

Why does MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. matter?

MacPherson is the case that liberated products liability from contract law. It is taught as the moment negligence duty was untethered from privity, and it is a marquee example of common-law reasoning — Cardozo taking existing exceptions and reasoning his way to a new general rule without pretending to overrule anything. In the arc of the products liability unit, MacPherson is the first stop: it establishes manufacturer negligence liability to consumers. From there your course moves toward implied warranty (Henningsen), Justice Traynor's concurrence in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. arguing for strict liability, and finally Greenman v. Yuba Power Products and Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, which impose strict liability on manufacturers for defective products. MacPherson is where that entire storyline begins.

How to survive the cold call on MacPherson

Professors use MacPherson to test whether you understand the difference between contract-based and tort-based duty. Expect these questions:

• "Who did MacPherson buy the car from?" A dealer — not Buick. That is the setup for the privity problem; don't fumble it.
• "So why can he sue Buick if he never dealt with Buick?" Because the duty is imposed by law in tort, not created by contract. When a product is reasonably certain to endanger life if negligently made, and the manufacturer knows it will be used by people other than the buyer, the duty runs to the foreseeable user.
• "What was the old rule, and where did the exception come from?" Privity was required (Winterbottom v. Wright); Thomas v. Winchester carved out an exception for things inherently dangerous, like mislabeled poison. Cardozo expanded that exception.
• "Is a car 'inherently dangerous'?" Trap. The point is that Cardozo moved away from that fixed label. The test isn't whether the thing is inherently dangerous — it's whether it becomes dangerous when negligently made and whether harm to others is foreseeable.
• "Is this a strict liability case?" No — and this is the most common student error. MacPherson is a negligence case. Buick was liable because it was negligent in failing to inspect. Strict liability comes later (Escola concurrence, Greenman, § 402A). Do not conflate them.
• "What did Buick do wrong?" It failed to inspect a wheel it could reasonably have inspected before selling the finished car. The manufacturer of the finished product cannot outsource its inspection duty by buying parts from a supplier.

The cleanest one-sentence answer to have ready: MacPherson holds that a manufacturer owes a duty of care to any foreseeable user of a product that is reasonably certain to endanger life if negligently made, regardless of privity — grounding negligence liability in foreseeability rather than contract.

How does MacPherson show up on the exam?

On an issue-spotter, MacPherson is the answer to the question: "Can the injured consumer sue the manufacturer even though they bought from a retailer?" Any fact pattern with a chain of sale — manufacturer to distributor to dealer to consumer — is testing whether you'll wrongly say "no privity, no claim." You spot the issue by noting there is no direct contract and then explaining that under MacPherson privity is not required for a manufacturer's negligence duty.

The trap students fall into: treating MacPherson as if it resolves the whole case. It does not. It gives you duty. You still have to run the full negligence analysis — duty, breach (did the manufacturer act unreasonably, e.g., fail to inspect?), causation, and damages. On an exam, establish the duty via MacPherson, then keep going. The second trap is answering a MacPherson question with strict liability language; if the call asks about negligence liability, stay in negligence and save strict liability (§ 402A) for its own issue. A sophisticated answer notes that on the same facts you might have both a negligence theory (MacPherson) and a strict products liability theory (Greenman/§ 402A), and analyzes them separately.

What cases are taught alongside MacPherson?

• Winterbottom v. Wright (1842) — the old privity rule MacPherson dismantles.
• Thomas v. Winchester (1852) — the "inherently dangerous" (mislabeled poison) exception Cardozo builds from.
• Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors (1960) — extends manufacturer liability through implied warranty and defeats disclaimers.
• Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. (1944) — Justice Traynor's famous concurrence arguing for strict liability, the next conceptual leap.
• Greenman v. Yuba Power Products (1963) — adopts strict products liability, and, with Restatement (Second) § 402A, completes the shift MacPherson started.