In International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), the U.S. Supreme Court held that a state court may exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant only if the defendant has "certain minimum contacts" with the forum state such that the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." This decision replaced the rigid territorial rule of Pennoyer v. Neff with a flexible contacts-based standard and is the foundation of the entire modern law of personal jurisdiction.

If you learn one case cold in 1L Civil Procedure, make it this one. Every personal-jurisdiction case you brief for the rest of the semester is a footnote to International Shoe. The phrases "minimum contacts" and "fair play and substantial justice" are the exact words your professor wants coming out of your mouth on the cold call and the exact words that need to appear in your exam answer.

What is International Shoe Co. v. Washington about? (Case Summary)

International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), was decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in an opinion by Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone. The State of Washington sought to collect unemployment-compensation contributions from International Shoe Company, a Delaware corporation headquartered in Missouri, based on the activities of the company's salesmen in Washington. The question was whether Washington could constitutionally hale the corporation into its courts. The Court said yes — and in doing so, replaced the old rule that jurisdiction depended on a defendant's physical presence within the state with a new, flexible standard built around the defendant's "contacts" with the forum and basic fairness.

What were the facts of International Shoe v. Washington?

International Shoe Company was incorporated in Delaware, with its principal place of business in St. Louis, Missouri. It manufactured and sold shoes. The company had no office in Washington, made no contracts for sale or purchase of merchandise there, maintained no stock of goods there, and made no deliveries within the state.

What it did have was a sales force. International Shoe employed roughly eleven to thirteen salesmen in Washington over the relevant years. These salesmen resided in Washington, were supervised from the company's out-of-state offices, and were paid commissions on sales. They solicited orders from Washington buyers by displaying sample shoes (often a single shoe from a pair) and rented rooms in hotels and business buildings to show samples. The orders they took were sent to the home office for acceptance, and shoes were shipped from outside the state directly to purchasers in Washington. The salesmen's commissions totaled more than $31,000 a year.

The State of Washington assessed International Shoe for contributions to the state unemployment-compensation fund, arguing that the company's in-state sales activity made it an employer subject to the tax. The state served notice by delivering a copy of the assessment to one of the company's salesmen in Washington and by mailing a copy to the company's Missouri headquarters. International Shoe appeared specially — that is, it showed up only to object to jurisdiction — and argued that its activities in Washington were not enough to make it "present" in the state, so Washington's courts had no power over it.

What was the procedural history?

The unemployment-compensation assessment was upheld through Washington's administrative process and then affirmed by the Supreme Court of Washington, which held that the company's activities established a sufficient connection to justify the state's jurisdiction and its tax. International Shoe appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, framing the issue as a federal constitutional question under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed.

What was the legal issue?

Does a state court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident corporate defendant — based solely on the systematic sales activities of the company's in-state salesmen — violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when the company is not "present" in the traditional physical sense?

What did International Shoe v. Washington hold? (Holding & Rule)

Holding: No. The Court held that Washington could constitutionally exercise personal jurisdiction over International Shoe. The company's continuous and systematic activities in Washington gave rise to the very obligation being sued upon, and subjecting it to suit there did not offend due process.

The rule — memorize this exact language: Due process requires only that, in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he is not present within the territory of the forum, he have "certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" This is the sentence that goes in your outline, in your exam answer, and out of your mouth on the cold call.

The Court added a second, exam-critical layer: the quality and nature of the defendant's activity determine how far jurisdiction reaches. Casual or single, isolated contacts may not be enough, and may only support jurisdiction on claims arising from those contacts; continuous and systematic activities that give rise to the liability sued on will support jurisdiction; and activities so substantial and continuous may even support suits on unrelated claims. This spectrum is the seed of the modern specific vs. general jurisdiction distinction.

What was the Court's reasoning?

Chief Justice Stone's opinion did two big things. First, it dismantled the fiction underlying the old regime. Under Pennoyer v. Neff (1878), jurisdiction over a defendant depended on the defendant's physical presence in the forum — you could only be sued somewhere if you were physically there when served, domiciled there, or consented. For corporations, courts had strained this into fictions about corporate "presence" and "implied consent" wherever a corporation did business. Stone rejected the fiction as unhelpful: "presence" was just a shorthand for whether the corporation's activities were enough to make jurisdiction fair.

Second, the opinion reframed the whole inquiry around fairness and the defendant's relationship to the forum. Because a corporation is an abstraction that acts only through agents, the real question is whether its activities in the state are "continuous and systematic" and whether those activities give rise to the claim. Stone reasoned that when a corporation exercises the privilege of conducting activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and protection of that state's laws — and so it is not unfair to require it to answer in that state for obligations arising out of those activities. This benefits-and-burdens logic (you take the state's protection, you accept its jurisdiction) is a favorite professor talking point.

Applying the standard, the Court found International Shoe's activities in Washington were "systematic and continuous": year after year, its salesmen operated in the state, solicited substantial orders, and generated large commissions. Those activities resulted in a large volume of interstate business and gave the company the benefit of Washington's laws and protection. Because the tax obligation being sued on arose out of those very activities, requiring the company to defend in Washington did not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.

Justice Black's concurrence (worth knowing if your professor flags it): Black agreed with the result but worried that the majority's "fair play and substantial justice" language gave judges too much subjective, standardless power to strike down a state's exercise of jurisdiction. He wanted states to have broad, clear authority over corporations doing business within their borders and feared the new balancing test would become a tool for shielding large corporations. His concern turned out to be prescient — decades of doctrine since have argued over exactly how much fairness-balancing courts may do.

Why does International Shoe matter?

International Shoe is the hinge of the entire personal-jurisdiction unit. It marks the transition from the rigid, territorial, presence-based world of Pennoyer to the flexible, contacts-based world you live in for the rest of the course. When your professor draws a timeline on the board, this is the case in the middle that changes everything.

Two doctrinal branches grow out of it. First, the general/specific jurisdiction distinction: the Court's language about contacts that "give rise to" the claim versus activities "so substantial and of such a nature" as to justify suit on unrelated claims is later formalized. Second, the two-step framework every later case uses: (1) does the defendant have minimum contacts with the forum, and (2) would jurisdiction offend fair play and substantial justice. Almost every case you brief after this — World-Wide Volkswagen, Burger King, Asahi, J. McIntyre, Goodyear, Daimler, Ford — is an argument about how to apply these two steps.

Cold-Call Prep: the questions your professor will actually ask

This is where a brief earns its keep. Expect these:

• "What rule did the Court announce?" Answer with the exact phrase: a defendant not present in the forum must have "certain minimum contacts" with it "such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Say those exact words.
• "What did this case replace?" It replaced Pennoyer v. Neff's territorial, physical-presence rule. Be ready to explain why: the presence rule and the corporate-presence fiction couldn't sensibly handle multistate corporate activity.
• "What were International Shoe's contacts with Washington?" Don't just say "it did business there." Be specific: 11–13 resident salesmen, systematic solicitation of orders using sample shoes, rented display rooms, over $31,000/year in commissions, sustained over multiple years — but no office, no in-state contracts, no stock of goods, and delivery from out of state. The point is that continuous and systematic solicitation was enough and the claim arose from it.
• "Why was it fair to make International Shoe defend in Washington?" Give the benefits-and-burdens answer: the company enjoyed the benefits and protection of Washington's laws by conducting activities there, so it is reasonable to require it to answer for obligations arising out of those activities.
• "What's the difference between the two types of contacts the Court describes?" This is the professor testing whether you see the general/specific seed. Contacts that give rise to the claim can support jurisdiction on that claim; contacts so continuous and substantial can support jurisdiction even on unrelated claims; single or casual contacts generally cannot support jurisdiction on unrelated claims.
• "What did Justice Black say?" He concurred in the result but objected that the majority's fairness test gave courts too much subjective discretion and could be used to protect corporations from state authority.

The trap on the cold call: paraphrasing the rule instead of quoting it. Professors want the magic words "minimum contacts" and "fair play and substantial justice" verbatim, because those phrases are the doctrine.

On the Exam: how International Shoe shows up

International Shoe almost never appears on a Civ Pro exam as "explain this case." It appears as the framework you apply to a made-up defendant with messy facts. A typical issue-spotter gives you an out-of-state company or individual sued in State X, and you must run the analysis: (1) Is there a basis for jurisdiction — does the defendant have minimum contacts with State X? (2) Does exercising jurisdiction comport with fair play and substantial justice?

The most common student mistake is stopping at "they did some business there, so there's jurisdiction." That skips the analysis. You must characterize the quality and nature of the contacts (isolated vs. continuous and systematic), decide whether the claim arises out of those contacts (specific) or whether the contacts are so substantial they support jurisdiction on unrelated claims (general), and then run the fairness factors that later cases add on top of International Shoe. Cite International Shoe as the source of the two-step test, then layer the refinements from later cases (purposeful availment from Burger King/Hanson, the fairness factors from World-Wide Volkswagen, the general-jurisdiction "at home" test from Daimler). The examiner is testing whether you can move from the rule to the facts and back.

A second trap: treating "minimum contacts" and "fair play and substantial justice" as one test rather than two related steps. Keep them as distinct moves in your analysis — even a defendant with contacts can sometimes defeat jurisdiction on fairness grounds under later doctrine.

Related cases taught alongside International Shoe

• Pennoyer v. Neff (1878) — the territorial regime International Shoe replaces; presence, domicile, and consent as jurisdictional bases.
• World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson (1980) — foreseeability alone is not enough; introduces purposeful availment and the fairness factors.
• Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985) — purposeful availment and the two-part specific-jurisdiction analysis fully articulated.
• Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court (1987) — the stream-of-commerce split and heightened attention to reasonableness.
• Goodyear (2011) and Daimler AG v. Bauman (2014) — narrow general jurisdiction to where a corporation is "at home."
• Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court (2021) — refines the "arise out of or relate to" requirement for specific jurisdiction.

FAQ

See the frequently asked questions below for quick answers to the points professors and exams test most.