Intentional torts are civil wrongs committed when a person acts with the purpose of causing a particular result — or with substantial certainty that the result will occur — and that act causes harm. The seven classic intentional torts are battery, assault, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, trespass to land, trespass to chattels, and conversion. Unlike negligence, they require intent, not merely carelessness, and 'intent' means intent to do the act and cause the contact or result — not intent to cause injury or to break the law.

Here's the thing your professor is really testing when they assign this unit: they don't care whether you can define battery. They care whether you understand what intent means, because that single word is the fault line between the intentional torts and the rest of your Torts course. Nail the meaning of intent and half of this material takes care of itself.

What is intent in tort law?

This is the whole ballgame, so start here. Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts §8A, a person acts with intent when they act either (1) with the purpose of causing a particular result, or (2) with knowledge that the result is substantially certain to follow. Those are two independent routes to intent — the plaintiff wins by proving either one.

The classic case for the substantial-certainty prong is Garratt v. Dailey (Wash. 1955), where a five-year-old boy pulled a chair out from under an arthritic woman as she went to sit. The court held that even if the boy didn't want to hurt her, he could be liable for battery if he knew with substantial certainty that she would hit the ground when he moved the chair. That case is the reason your casebook teaches intent through a child: it strips out the moral blame and forces you to see that intent is about knowledge and purpose regarding the result, not about wanting to cause harm.

Three things intent is not, and each one is a favorite exam trap:

• Intent is not motive. A defendant who touches you 'just to be friendly' still commits battery if the contact is offensive and intended. Good motives don't erase intent.
• Intent is not intent to injure. You need intent to cause the contact (for battery) or the apprehension (for assault), not intent to cause injury. This is where students lose points constantly.
• Intent is not intent to break the law. The defendant need not know the act is tortious or illegal.

One more piece you'll see across every intentional tort: the doctrine of transferred intent. If the defendant intends to commit one of the five original trespass torts (battery, assault, false imprisonment, trespass to land, trespass to chattels) and instead accomplishes a different one, or harms a different victim than the one intended, the intent 'transfers.' Throw a punch at A, miss, and hit B — the intent to batter A transfers to the battery of B. Intend to scare (assault) but actually make contact — the assault intent supports the battery.

What are the elements of battery?

Battery is (1) a volitional act by the defendant, (2) done with intent to cause harmful or offensive contact (or apprehension of it, via transferred intent), (3) that causes (4) harmful or offensive contact with the plaintiff's person.

Break down the two words that carry the load:

• Harmful contact causes physical injury, pain, or impairment. Easy.
• Offensive contact is the one that generates exam questions. Contact is offensive if it would offend a reasonable person's sense of dignity — an objective standard. No physical injury is required. A spit in the face, an unwanted kiss, snatching a plate from someone's hand — all batteries.

Note the reach of 'the plaintiff's person.' It extends to anything so closely connected to the plaintiff that contact with it is treated as contact with the person. In Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel (Tex. 1967), a hotel employee snatched a plate from a Black patron's hand and shouted a racial slur; the Texas Supreme Court held this was a battery even though no part of the plaintiff's body was touched — the plate he was holding counted as an extension of his person. Remember that case for the proposition that battery protects dignity, not just skin.

What are the elements of assault?

Assault is (1) a volitional act, (2) done with intent to cause a harmful or offensive contact or the apprehension of one, (3) that causes (4) the plaintiff's reasonable apprehension of an imminent harmful or offensive contact.

Two exam-critical points:

• Apprehension is not fear. Apprehension means awareness or expectation that contact is about to occur. A 90-pound plaintiff can be assaulted by a threatened punch even if utterly unafraid of it, so long as they perceive the contact is coming.
• Imminence is strict. Words alone generally do not constitute assault — there must be some overt act, and the threatened contact must be imminent, not future. 'I'll beat you up next week' is not assault. 'Words can negate' too: 'If you weren't my friend, I'd hit you' can defeat imminence.

The plaintiff must actually be aware of the threatened contact — you can't be assaulted from behind if you never knew. (Contrast battery, where awareness at the moment of contact is not required — you can be battered in your sleep.)

What is false imprisonment?

False imprisonment is (1) an act by the defendant intending to confine the plaintiff, (2) within boundaries fixed by the defendant, (3) that actually results in confinement, and (4) of which the plaintiff is aware (or by which the plaintiff is harmed).

Confinement can be accomplished by physical barriers, physical force, threats of force, or the assertion of legal authority. It is not accomplished by moral pressure or future threats. Critically, there must be no reasonable means of escape known to the plaintiff — if a door the plaintiff knows about is unlocked, there's no confinement. And confinement in a given direction is not false imprisonment if the plaintiff is free to go elsewhere.

Watch the shopkeeper's privilege, a frequent flyer on exams: a merchant with reasonable belief that a person has shoplifted may detain them for a reasonable time in a reasonable manner to investigate. That privilege is a defense to a false imprisonment claim.

What is intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED)?

IIED is (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant, (2) done intentionally or recklessly, (3) that causes (4) the plaintiff severe emotional distress.

IIED is the outlier among the intentional torts. It's newer, it doesn't get transferred intent, and its 'extreme and outrageous' element is the hardest to satisfy — the conduct must be 'so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency,' as the Restatement (Second) §46 puts it. Mere insults, indignities, and threats generally don't qualify. Because the standard is so high, IIED is often described as the tort courts reach for when the harm is real but the other pigeonholes don't fit.

Note the expanded mental state: recklessness suffices for IIED, not just purpose or substantial certainty. And a special rule governs bystanders: a third party who witnesses the outrageous conduct can recover if they were present, the defendant knew of their presence, and (for non-family members) they suffered bodily harm from the distress.

What are the property torts: trespass to land, trespass to chattels, and conversion?

Trespass to land is an intentional physical entry onto land in the possession of another (or causing an object or third person to enter). The intent required is only intent to enter the land — not intent to trespass. So a defendant who reasonably but mistakenly believes they own the land still trespasses. No actual damage is required; nominal damages are available.

Trespass to chattels is an intentional interference with the plaintiff's right of possession in personal property — by dispossessing them of it or by using or intermeddling with it. Here, unlike trespass to land, the plaintiff generally must show actual damage: harm to the chattel, deprivation of use for a time, or bodily harm.

Conversion is an intentional exercise of dominion or control over a chattel that so seriously interferes with the plaintiff's right of control that the defendant is justly required to pay the chattel's full value. The remedy is a forced sale — the defendant pays the full market value and effectively 'buys' the chattel.

The exam question is almost always: is this trespass to chattels or conversion? The answer turns on the degree of interference. Borrow a car for an hour and return it unharmed — trespass to chattels (probably no recovery, no damage). Steal it, destroy it, or keep it for months — conversion, and the defendant owes full value. Courts weigh factors: extent and duration of control, the defendant's good or bad faith, harm to the chattel, and inconvenience to the plaintiff.

What are the defenses to intentional torts?

Even a clean prima facie case can be defeated by a privilege. The defendant bears the burden of pleading and proving these:

• Consent. A plaintiff who consents to the contact has no claim (volenti non fit injuria). Consent can be express or implied from conduct or custom (bumping in a crowd, contact sports). Consent obtained by fraud or duress, or exceeded in scope, is invalid — and consent to a criminal act is treated differently across jurisdictions.
• Self-defense. One may use reasonable force to defend against an imminent threatened battery — force proportional to the threat. Deadly force is permitted only against a threat of death or serious bodily harm.
• Defense of others. Reasonable force to protect a third party; the majority rule protects a defender who reasonably (even if mistakenly) believes the third party is entitled to defend.
• Defense of property. Reasonable, non-deadly force to protect property. You may never use deadly force or a deadly mechanical device (spring gun) solely to protect property — the rule from Katko v. Briney (Iowa 1971), where a spring gun set to protect an abandoned farmhouse maimed a trespasser and the homeowner was held liable.
• Necessity. Split into two flavors, and the distinction is a classic exam pairing. Public necessity (acting to protect the community) is a complete defense — no liability. Private necessity (acting to protect oneself or one's property) is an incomplete privilege: the actor may use another's property but must pay for actual damage caused. See Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co. (Minn. 1910) — a shipowner who kept a boat lashed to a dock during a storm to save the ship wasn't a trespasser, but still had to pay for the damage to the dock.

The exam traps that cost 1Ls points

This unit is a gift on the exam if you avoid the predictable errors:

• Defining intent as intent to injure. The single most common mistake. Say 'substantial certainty' out loud when you spot the issue.
• Skipping transferred intent. When the intended victim or tort differs from the actual one, name the doctrine explicitly — don't just conclude battery.
• Confusing assault with battery. Assault protects the mind (apprehension); battery protects the body (contact). One fact pattern often contains both — a swing that misses (assault) followed by a swing that lands (battery).
• Forgetting nominal damages. Trespass to land and battery don't require actual injury. Don't dismiss a claim just because no one got hurt.
• Blowing the trespass-to-chattels / conversion line. Always analyze it as a spectrum of interference and argue both, then pick.
• Treating private necessity as a full defense. It privileges the entry but not the damages. Vincent is the whole point.

How the intentional torts fit together

Think of this unit as three groups sharing one engine. The engine is intent — defined once in Garratt and applied everywhere. The three groups are torts against the person (battery, assault, false imprisonment, IIED), torts against property (trespass to land, trespass to chattels, conversion), and the privileges that defeat them (consent, the defensive privileges, necessity). On the exam, move in that order: is there a prima facie tort against person or property, and if so, does a privilege cut it off? Do that mechanically and you will out-organize most of the curve.

Where this unit sits in your course matters too. Intentional torts come first because they're the cleanest introduction to the tort structure — act, intent, causation, harm — before Torts gets messy with negligence, duty, and proximate cause. The clarity is the point. Master the moving parts here and you'll recognize the same skeleton dressed up in different clothes for the rest of the semester.