Garratt v. Dailey is the case that teaches you what "intent" actually means in intentional torts — and it does it with the least sympathetic possible defendant: a five-year-old boy who allegedly pulled a chair out from under an arthritic woman. If you learn one thing from this case, learn this: the intent in battery is about the contact, not the injury. Brian Dailey didn't have to want to hurt Ruth Garratt. The question was far narrower — and far more interesting.

In Garratt v. Dailey, 46 Wash. 2d 197, 279 P.2d 1091 (1955), the Washington Supreme Court held that the intent required for battery is satisfied when a person acts either with the purpose of causing a harmful or offensive contact or with knowledge to a substantial certainty that such contact will result. The court did not decide whether young Brian was liable — it sent the case back down because the trial court had never found what Brian actually knew.

What is the Garratt v. Dailey case about? (Case Summary)

Garratt v. Dailey, 46 Wash. 2d 197, 279 P.2d 1091 (1955), was decided by the Supreme Court of Washington. Ruth Garratt sued Brian Dailey, a five-year-old, for battery after she fell and fractured her hip. The trial court found for Brian, concluding he had not intended to injure Garratt and had not acted with unlawful force. On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court clarified the correct standard for intent in a battery claim, held that the trial court had applied an incomplete understanding of that standard, and remanded for a specific factual finding on what Brian knew when he acted.

What are the facts of Garratt v. Dailey?

Ruth Garratt visited the home where Brian Dailey, age five, was also present. According to Garratt's version, as she started to sit down in a wood-and-canvas lawn chair, Brian deliberately pulled the chair out from under her, causing her to fall to the ground and fracture her hip. Brian's version was different: he testified that he had moved the chair to sit in it himself, saw Garratt about to sit down, and tried to move the chair back under her — but was too small and too slow to get it in place before she fell.

The trial court believed Brian's version: it found he did not have any purpose to cause Garratt to fall and did not intend to injure her. That factual posture is critical — the case comes to the Washington Supreme Court on Brian's own account of events, which makes the intent question sharper, not easier for the plaintiff.

What was the procedural history of Garratt v. Dailey?

Ruth Garratt sued Brian Dailey in Washington trial court. The trial court entered judgment for Brian, the defendant, finding that he had not intended to cause harm and had not acted wrongfully — and it dismissed the action. Garratt appealed to the Supreme Court of Washington. That court did not reverse outright; it identified an error in the trial court's understanding of intent, remanded for clarification of the findings, and expressly retained jurisdiction to review the amount of damages so the issue could be resolved efficiently if Garratt ultimately prevailed on remand.

What was the legal issue in Garratt v. Dailey?

The precise question: Did Brian Dailey commit a battery — that is, did he act with the intent required for battery — when the trial court had found he did not intend to injure Ruth Garratt, but had not made any finding about whether he knew with substantial certainty that she would attempt to sit where the chair had been?

Reframed for your outline: What is the intent required for battery, and is it satisfied by knowledge to a substantial certainty that a contact will occur, even absent a purpose to cause harm?

What did Garratt v. Dailey hold?

The Washington Supreme Court held that the intent element of battery is satisfied if the defendant either (1) acted with the purpose of bringing about a harmful or offensive contact, or (2) acted with knowledge that such contact was substantially certain to result. The court adopted the Restatement of Torts' formulation of intent. Because the trial court had made no finding on whether Brian knew with substantial certainty that Garratt would try to sit where the chair had been, the record was incomplete. The court remanded for the trial judge to make that finding — a finding that, if answered against Brian, would establish the intent required for battery even though he did not intend to injure her.

The rule (put this in your outline): The intent required for an intentional tort like battery is satisfied where the actor knows with substantial certainty that his act will cause the harmful or offensive contact. Intent goes to the contact, not to the resulting harm. A defendant need not desire or intend injury.

What was the court's reasoning?

The court's logic runs in a clean line. Battery requires an intentional act. But "intentional" does not mean "malicious" or "harm-seeking." Borrowing from the Restatement, the court defined intent to include not just purpose but also substantial certainty of a result. If a person does something knowing to a substantial certainty that a contact will follow, the law treats the person as having intended that contact — even if the contact was not the person's goal.

Applied to Brian: the trial court's finding that Brian did not intend to injure Garratt did not resolve the case, because injury is not the object of the intent inquiry. The relevant question was whether Brian, when he moved the chair, knew with substantial certainty that Garratt was about to sit in the spot the chair had occupied. If he had that knowledge, he had the intent for battery — regardless of his age and regardless of his lack of any wish to hurt her. Because the trial court never made that finding, the appellate court could not affirm or reverse on the merits; it had to send the case back.

Notice what the court does not do. It does not hold that a five-year-old is automatically capable of forming intent, nor that Brian actually had it. It holds only that if the factfinder concludes Brian knew with substantial certainty what would happen, that is legally sufficient intent. The age question folds into the factual inquiry — could a child of Brian's age and maturity have had that knowledge? — rather than serving as a blanket defense.

Why does Garratt v. Dailey matter?

Garratt sits at the very front of the intentional torts unit because it defines the single most tested concept in that unit: intent. Almost every intentional tort — battery, assault, false imprisonment, trespass — requires intent, and Garratt supplies the definition your whole course will run on. It teaches three things at once:

• Intent = purpose OR substantial certainty. This is the disjunctive test you'll apply again and again.
• Intent attaches to the contact, not the harm. A defendant who intends only a harmless or even friendly contact can still be liable for battery if the contact turns out to be harmful or offensive — you don't get to intend a lesser result.
• Capacity to form intent is a fact question, not a status defense. Children and even the mentally incompetent can commit intentional torts if they in fact had the requisite intent.

Garratt also sets up the famous dual-intent vs. single-intent debate. Under single intent (the majority/Restatement (Second) view most professors teach as the default), the defendant need only intend the contact — not that the contact be harmful or offensive. Under dual intent (adopted in some jurisdictions), the defendant must intend both the contact and that it be harmful or offensive. Garratt's language about intending a "harmful or offensive contact" is the launching point for this fight. Know which side your professor and casebook come down on.

Cold-Call Prep: how to survive Garratt v. Dailey

This is a favorite cold-call case precisely because students misstate the holding. Here's what you'll be asked and how to answer.

"What did the trial court find, and why wasn't that enough?" The trial court found Brian did not intend to injure Garratt. That wasn't enough because intent in battery goes to the contact, not the injury — the trial court answered the wrong question and never made a finding on what Brian knew.

"So did the Washington Supreme Court find Brian liable?" No — and this is the trap. The court did NOT decide liability. It remanded for a factual finding on whether Brian knew with substantial certainty that Garratt would try to sit where the chair had been. Never say the court held Brian liable.

"What is the rule the court adopted?" Intent for battery is satisfied by purpose to cause a harmful or offensive contact OR knowledge to a substantial certainty that such contact will result. Cite the Restatement source if your professor likes that.

"Why does it matter that Brian was five?" It doesn't create a defense. Age is relevant only to the factual question of whether a child of Brian's age could have had substantial certainty. A young child can commit an intentional tort.

"Suppose Brian moved the chair as a joke, hoping she'd fall softly onto the grass and laugh. Battery?" Yes, potentially — because he intended the contact (falling), and the contact turned out to be harmful. Motive and desire to be friendly or funny don't negate intent. This is the professor's follow-up that separates students who understand the case from those who memorized it.

"What's the difference between substantial certainty and recklessness?" Substantial certainty is near-inevitability of the result — knowledge that it will almost surely happen. Recklessness is a conscious disregard of a substantial risk. The line between them is where a lot of intentional-tort exam points live.

How does Garratt v. Dailey show up on the exam?

On an issue-spotter, Garratt is the authority you cite the moment intent is contested. The classic fact pattern: a defendant does something with no wish to hurt anyone — pulls a chair, throws a firecracker into a crowd "just to scare people," pushes past someone in a doorway — and the plaintiff gets hurt. Your job is to run the disjunctive test.

The trap: Students conclude "no battery" because the defendant "didn't mean to hurt anyone." That's the exact error the trial court made in Garratt. Never let intent-to-injure be your intent analysis. Instead, ask: Did the defendant have a purpose to cause the contact? If not, did the defendant know with substantial certainty that the contact would occur? If either is yes, intent is satisfied — then move on to the other elements (harmful or offensive contact, causation).

The second trap: forgetting to flag the single-intent vs. dual-intent split when the defendant intended a contact but not that it be harmful or offensive (think the friendly-tap-that-hurts hypo). Sophisticated answers note both views and apply the one your jurisdiction/professor uses, then note the outcome might differ under the other.

Related cases and doctrines

Garratt travels with a small cluster of intentional-tort classics your casebook likely pairs with it:

• Vosburg v. Putney — the schoolboy kick case; teaches that you intend the contact and take your victim as you find him (eggshell plaintiff in intentional torts).
• Spivey v. Battaglia — a friendly hug that caused injury; explores where substantial certainty ends and mere risk (negligence) begins.
• White v. University of Idaho and similar "unusual contact" cases — reinforce that intent attaches to contact, not consequence.
• Doctrine of transferred intent — intent to commit one intentional tort (or against one person) transfers to another; pairs naturally with Garratt's intent framework.

Master Garratt and you've mastered the definition that the rest of the intentional-torts unit assumes.